Seldom has such a motley coalition, with such different initial aims, gone to war. What is at stake for its members as well as critics of the attack on Muammar Gaddafi's forces in Libya?
Securing uninterrupted access to Libya's energy resources is not the reason why Europeans have pushed for military action. For, although Libya's proven reserves are the biggest in Africa, it supplies only 2 per cent of global oil output, and Italy, its biggest single customer, was initially opposed to the operation.
Furthermore, if oil is what the Europeans are after, launching air attacks is just about the worst way to go about it: wells, refineries and pipelines are highly vulnerable targets which, once destroyed, take years to replace. Iraq's oil industry, for instance, has still not recovered from the last war.
The key to Europe's involvement is to be found in the domestic political calculations of Britain and France, the two nations championing the military offensive. Both were caught unprepared by the wave of Arab revolts, and both have struggled to regain the initiative.
A French foreign minister had to resign when it emerged that she had benefited from links with the former rulers of Tunisia. The resulting uproar dented the reputation of President Nicolas Sarkozy.
Meanwhile, British Prime Minister David Cameron fared little better. His government committed a series of blunders, such as the shambolic airlift of its citizens from Libya and the botched 'spy' mission to help the rebels.
By pushing for military action, both leaders are hoping to divert public attention from their recent humiliations.
The tactic is working. Mr Cameron is now hailed as a visionary, while Mr Sarkozy's popularity ratings are bouncing back.
France and Britain have also been joined by a number of other Europeans such as Spain, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, for whom the protection of innocent civilians is the prime consideration.
THE UNITED STATES
The Obama administration initially dismissed intervention as 'loose talk', calculating that US national interests are not directly affected and that Washington can ill-afford to launch a third military adventure in the Muslim world, on top of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Matters changed last week, when it became clear that Libya's rebels faced certain defeat and that the West may stand accused of callously disregarding the inevitable massacre. A group of close advisers who regard themselves as 'liberal interventionists' - Ms Samantha Power, a senior aide at the National Security Council, Ms Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the United Nations, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton - convinced the President that dithering was no longer an option. Ms Rice's arguments were especially persuasive: She was responsible for US policies towards Africa during the 1990s, when the Rwanda genocide took place while the world stood idly by.
Still, President Barack Obama's commitment to Libya remains minimal. He told his military commanders that he expects operations to last 'days, not weeks'.
Meanwhile, the 'realists' who believe that the US should have as little to do with Libya as possible remain strong. They include Defence Secretary Robert Gates, National Security Adviser Tom Donilon and Mr John Brennan, Obama's counter-terrorism chief. America's military involvement could be terminated at a moment's notice.
THE ARABS
Although no Arab regime would willingly associate itself with a Western-led military offensive, the Arab League has backed the imposition of a 'no-fly' zone over Libya.
The Arabs have their own reasons to move against Libya, not least their dislike for Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and his grand-standing at Arab League meetings, where he would proclaim himself 'the dean of the Arab rulers'.
His nickname in the Middle East is el Majnoon, or 'the mad one'. The Saudis have also not forgotten that he once ordered the assassination of King Abdullah when he was then Crown Prince.
By contributing to the operation, Arab governments can burnish their credentials as supporters of democracy, without doing very much.
Qatar's decision to deploy four of its jet fighters remains purely symbolic. Nevertheless, the Arabs' support is fragile. One false step - such as a rogue air raid which kills a large number of civilians - would be enough to see most Arab nations disengage from the operation.
RUSSIA AND CHINA
The Russians have few strategic interests in this affair. Libya competes with Russian energy exports, and the Libyans have never been big buyers of Russian military equipment.
So, once the West asked Russia to refrain from imposing a veto in the UN Security Council, the only question for Moscow was what concessions it may obtain in return.
It got a good price for its acquiescence. This includes a US pledge to support Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organisation, as well as a promise to place a Chechen separatist leader on international terrorist blacklists.
The Chinese were more difficult to please, partly because of Beijing's objections to a military operation which violates a nation's sovereignty.
China also has big economic interests in Libya. Still, the Chinese were persuaded to avoid casting a veto by the fact that the Arab League supported intervention.
Both Russia and China can afford to sit on the sidelines, in the expectation that, whatever happens, they cannot lose. If Col Gaddafi survives the onslaught, they will be the only governments able to re-engage with him.
But, if he falls, both could claim to have contributed, albeit indirectly, to Libya's transformation.
Jonathan Eyal
From the Straits Times
jonathan.eyal@gmail.com
